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HOUSING THE HOMELESS THROUGH EXPANDING
ACCESS TO EXISTING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
PROGRAMS
BARBARA SARD'

T

HIS article asserts that homelessness in America today is essentially a product of the lack of affordable housing for very
low income people. "Macro" solutions in the form of increased
incomes, an increased number of subsidies for housing and an
increased supply of lower cost housing are vital. However, these
"macro" solutions require years of political and legislative effort.
If they are the only solutions to the problem, what are lawyers
representing homeless clients today to do? Is there a legal strategy available to assist currently homeless clients in solving their
central problem, namely, the lack of an affordable place to live?
The answer is: "Yes." Through expanding access to existing
housing subsidies, affordable housing can be made available for
homeless clients. This Article first explains why expanding access
for the homeless and imminently homeless to existing housing
subsidies is a valuable, workable, and short-term solution to the
immediate crisis-a lack of affordable housing. It then outlines
six strategies legal advocates may pursue to expand access for all
or sub-groups of the homeless to the existing housing subsidy resources in their community. Finally, the Article concludes with
some questions about the value of this approach, and, as space
allows, examines some limited and tentative answers.
1. The ideas in this Article have been generated and refined from the work
of the Homelessness Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS). I am indebted to the Unit's staff, particularly Dick Bauer and Steve Hitov, with whom I
have worked to develop and implement the strategies discussed in this Article;
to Dan Manning, GBLS Associate Director, for the opportunity and encouragement to do this work; and to the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless,
which has been both the primary client in these efforts and the source of many of
the ideas. Florence Roisman of the National Housing Law Project has provided
both challenging critiques and helpful suggestions in the development of the
underlying ideas of this Article, as well as the earlier drafts. Lisa M. Otero has
provided invaluable research assistance. I am indebted to my husband, Burt
Nadler, and my children, Cory and Max, for their forbearance and support during the substantial time this Article's writing has taken from our family.
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WHY EXPANDING ACCESS TO EXISTING HOUSING SUBSIDIES
A WORTHWHILE APPROACH TO REMEDYING
HOMELESSNESS

IS

The current homelessness crisis in our society is primarily
the result of the increasing gap between household income and
housing costs. While individual "dysfunctions" may help explain
which families or individuals are most vulnerable to the shortfall
in the supply of affordable housing,2 the predominant cause of
the worst homelessness epidemic since the Great Depression is
increasing poverty 3 at a time when there is a decreasing supply of
4
low-cost housing.
2. For a discussion of how personal characteristics, such as physical health,
mental health, social supports and criminal convictions increase the likelihood
that an extremely poor individual will become homeless, see P. Rossi, DOWN
AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 143-44 (1989). For
profiles of the current homeless population, the economic forces that have
shaped its plight and a discussion of how it differs from past homeless populations, see Hopper & Hamburg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to
New Poor, 1945-1984, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 12-13 (R. Bratt, C.
Hartman & A. Meyerson eds. 1986); and M. HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN
POVERTY (1984).

3. According to the Census Bureau statistics from 1986, 32.4 million people (13.6% of Americans), were officially "poor," meaning that their incomes
fell below the federally-defined poverty level. I. SHAPIRO & R. GREENSTEIN,
HOLES IN THE SAFETY NETS: POVERTY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES IN THE STATES 3

(1988). The persistence of a 13-14% poverty rate evidences the substantial
worsening of poverty since the 1970s. S. DANZIGER, R. HAVEMAN & R. PLOTNICK,
ANTI-POVERTY POLICY: EFFECTS ON THE POOR AND THE NONPOOR 9 (1986) (pre-

pared for delivery at conference on "Poverty and Policy: Retrospect and Prospects" in Williamsburg, Va., Dec. 6-8, 1984). In 1973, the poverty rate was
reduced to a low of 11.1%, down from the pre-war poverty level of 19%. Id.
Currently, official poverty rates severely understate the number of Americans
unable to afford housing. See M. HARRINGTON, supra note 2, at ch. 4. The poverty rate is premised on the 1950s consumption pattern in which the "average"
family spent one-third of its income on food. Id. Largely because of the enormous increase in housing costs, only about one-fourth of family income is now
available for food consumption. Id. In 1985, nearly half of all poor renters paid
at least 70% of their incomes just for housing costs. P. LEONARD, C. DOLBEARE
& E. LAZERE, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR Xi

(1989) (published by Center on Budget and Policy Priorities) [hereinafter LEONARD]. The number of poor and the rate of poverty have increased and poor
families are now deeper in poverty: "Between 1975 and 1986, the proportion of
poor people with incomes under one-half the poverty line surged from 29.9% to
39.2%." Center for Law & Social Policy, Basic Poverty, in POVERTY PICTURE 1
(1988) (collection of fact sheets on poverty in United States). For families subsisting on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the purchasing
power of such benefits "has eroded dramatically over time. From 1970 to 1987,
the maximum benefit for a family of four fell 31.4% in the median state." I.
SHAPIRO & R. GREENSTEIN, supra, at 8; see Sard, Roisman & Hartman, Homeless: A
Dialogue on Welfare and Housing Strategies, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 104, 106
(1989).
4. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUN-
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The confluence of these forces means that either there is too
little low-cost housing in a community for those who need it, or,
there is virtually no private-market housing within the economic
reach of the homeless. 5 The latter is particularly true in many
IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1990, at 33 (1990) [hereinafter
1990]. The latest survey of 30 major cities by the United
States Conference of Mayors cited the lack of affordable housing, unemployment and other employment-related problems such as poverty or the lack of
income, and inadequate benefit levels in public assistance programs as respectively the first, fourth and fifth most frequently reported causes of homelessness.
Id. Approximately one-third to one-half of the "new" homeless are estimated to
be members of families with children. Id. at 25-27. This group is the fastest
growing among the homeless. Hopper & Hamburg, supra note 2, at 30. The
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University recently stated: "There
can be no doubt that housing costs have risen faster than the incomes of the
nation's growing number of poverty-level households, and outstripped the ability of income transfer programs to cover these costs." W. APGAR, D. DIPASQUALE,J. CUMMINGS & N. MCARDLE, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 1990,
at 27 (1990) [hereinafter APGAR].
5. The disappearance of rental units at the low end of the market is a national phenomenon. In early 1986, the Housing Allowance Project, Inc., based
in Springfield, Massachusetts, surveyed private-market rents in Hampshire
County, Massachusetts. Hampshire County is a predominantly rural area with
one medium-sized city. The survey found that only approximately two percent
of all units rented for less than $350 per month and only one unit rented for less
than $300 per month. In 1970, there were 9.7 million units renting for less than
$250 per month; in 1985, there were 7.9 million such units. LEONARD, supra note
3, at 7. During the same 15 year period, the number of renter households with
incomes under $10,000/year increased from 7.3 million to 11.6 million. Id. In
some areas, such low cost units have essentially disappeared. Id.; APGAR, supra
note 4, at 10-15. In 1985, 64% of poor renters devoted more than half their
incomes to housing. Id.; see also, C. DOLBEARE, OUT OF REACH: WHY EVERYDAY
PEOPLE CAN'T FIND AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1990) (published by Low Income
Housing Information Service). For example, in 1989, Alabama's average fair
market rent (FMR) for a two bedroom apartment in a metropolitan community
was $370. C. DOLBEARE, supra, at Table 3. The FMR figure for each area in the
United States is determined by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), using the cost at the 45th percentile of standard quality
rental housing units leased to persons who have moved within the previous two
years, excluding public housing and units constructed within two years of the
survey date. Fair Market Rent Schedules, 56 Fed. Reg. 14733, 14733 (1991).
The Alabama FMR figure is 313.6% of $118, the maximum AFDC grant for a
three-person family, and 251.7% of $147, the maximum AFDC grant for a fourperson family. C. DOLBEARE, supra, at Table 3 (discussing AFDC grants in relation to average FMR). Reliable national data on the income of the single homeless does not exist. While some homeless individuals receive regular or sporadic
income from employment, others receive federally-funded benefits based on age
or disability under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. The SSI
program is enhanced by a state supplement in 27 states. I. SHAPIRO & R. GREENSTEIN, supra note 3, at 11. Although SSI benefits are more "generous" than
AFDC, SSI benefits fall below the poverty line in all but four states. Id. at 12.
One 1990 study compared the level of SSI benefits in 25 major metropolitan
areas to the cost of one-bedroom apartments in the same communities. It found
that in 12 of the cities, the entire monthly SSI grant was less than the FMR for a
one-bedroom apartment. In the remaining areas, a disabled or elderly individGER AND HOMELESSNESS
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major urban areas, which experienced extreme inflation in housing costs in the 1980s. 6 Furthermore, it is clear that the private
housing market alone cannot increase the supply of housing
7
which the homeless or imminently homeless can afford.
The solution to the income/housing gap lies in closing the
gap from either, or both, directions. The gap can be closed by
increasing the income of the homeless so they can afford existing
housing or by increasing the supply of housing subsidies that the
homeless and imminently homeless receive.8 The housing stock
ual would have from $0.07 to $2.77 left to spend each day after paying the rent.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS 17 (1990). Some

THE

CLOSING

DOOR:

ECONOMIC

of the homeless have no income at
all. Only eight states, as of 1987, provided state-funded general assistance to
more than the elderly and disabled. See I. SHAPIRO & R. GREENSTEIN, supra note
3, at 13. Only a few of these assistance programs were comprehensive, and
many have recently been cut back. Based on his research in Chicago, Rossi
found the median annual income of the homeless to be $1,198. P. Rossi, supra
note 2, at 40. This was comparable to nine other local studies which had found
the average median annual income of the homeless to be $1,127. Id. Michael
Stone uses the term "shelter poverty" to describe the growing phenomenon of
people paying so much of their incomes for housing that they are unable to
afford other basic necessities. M. STONE, ONE-THIRD OF A NATION: A NEW LOOK
AT HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN AMERICA 1 (1990). He concludes that nearly 27
million households, containing 32% of the population, are unable to meet their
non-shelter needs at even a minimum level of adequacy. Id. Stone further argues that the traditional measure of housing affordability as 25% or 30% of a
family's income is inaccurate because differences in household size and income
level create significant differences in amounts needed to cover non-shelter expenses and, consequently, in housing affordability thresholds. Id. at 4. Accordingly, using data from the 1970 Census of Housing and the 1975-87 American
Housing Surveys, he has developed an index of "shelter poverty" to take into
account the consumption dynamics that vary depending on household size and
available income. Id. at 5, 11-13; see Stone, Housing and the Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 41 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A.
Meyerson eds. 1986) [hereinafter Stone, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HousING]. In 1980, with an income of $11,000 per year, a family of four could not
afford to pay anything for housing if they met their other basic needs. Id. at 46.
6. Reeves, Mid-Priced at $47,200? Those Were the Days, Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 8, 1991, at 25 (median price for a home in 1980, $47,200; in 1990,
$79,100).
7. See Achtenburg & Marcuse, The Causes of the Housing Problem, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 4 (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A. Meyerson eds. 1986).
"[T]he principal reason [the housing problem exists] is that housing in our society is produced, financed, owned, operated, and sold in ways designed to serve
the interests of private capital." Id.
8. The analysis is the same regardless of how "homeless" is defined. The
narrow definition of homeless only includes those without any regular roof over
their heads, except possibly a shelter. A broader meaning encompasses those
without a roof they can call their own: "Home is 'the place where, when you go
there, they have to take you in.' " Williams v. Department of Human Servs., 116
N.J. 102, 124, 561 A.2d 244, 255-56 (1989) (quoting New Jersey Governor
Thomas Kean paraphrasing poet Robert Frost in The Death of the Hired Man). An
even broader definition of "homeless" would include the "housing desperate,"
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in some areas is such that increased incomes or housing purchasing power would substantially alleviate the problem. 9 Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to muster the political will to
expand and increase public assistance income maintenance programs that could provide such income. This problem is especially
true in communities where housing costs have escalated.' 0 Politthose who pay such a high proportion of household income for rent that they are
forced to deprive themselves or their families of basic necessities. See Stone, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 5, at 46. The "middle" group
are those without a roof of their own but who are permitted to stay temporarily
with friends or family. These accommodations are usually in overcrowded housing without sufficient bed space. These people are commonly called the "hidden homeless." Federal legislation and agency rules have omitted any reference
to the doubled-up "hidden homeless," while only recognizing the needs of the
"literally homeless" and the housing-desperate. For purposes of determining
"federal preference" for federal housing resources, HUD adopted the general
definition of homelessness found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (West Supp. 1991),
which states:
(a) For purposes of this Act, the term "homeless" or "homeless individual" or homeless person includes(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter
designed to provide temporary living accommodations
(including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for
individuals intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily
used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human
beings.
42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (West Supp. 1991). The definition of "homeless"
promulgated by HUD was almost entirely taken verbatim from the above provision. For a discussion of preferences, see infra notes 49-66 and accompanying
text.
9. There are some local housing markets without enough units (such as in
the Northeast and in urban areas of California) so that subsidies alone are insufficient. Vacancy rates in these areas are extremely low and the great demand for
apartment units of limited supply pushes up the prices of these units. In other
areas of the country, such as cities in Texas, housing stands vacant while
thousands are homeless. APGAR, supra note 4, at 5. This is due to the costs of
rental units exceeding incomes. For instance, gross rents reached $446 in the
Northeast by 1989 (up from $362 in 1980) and $490 in the West by 1986 (up
from $402 in 1980). Id. "With the stock of low-cost units continuing to shrink,
rent levels will remain high. As a result, more and more low-income households
must pay large shares of their income for marginally adequate housing." Id. at
2. In addition, the limited availability of rental housing as opposed to condominiums or houses, as well as discrimination in access to existing lower priced
housing, contributes to this problem.
10. See Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing. An Advocate's Guide, 20
HOUSING L. BULL. 65, 67 (1990). Roisman explains the AFDC standard of need
and payment level and discusses various advocacy and litigation strategies for
raising benefit levels as an answer to homelessness. Id. at 68-73. In the wake of
the 1990-91 recession, these legal/political strategies face a hostile environment
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ical barriers also exist regarding the creation of the job training,
public employment and child care programs that are necessary to
allow many of the homeless to increase their incomes through
employment rather than through income transfers."I
Whether by choice or necessity, the primary solution to the
income/housing gap driving the growing homelessness problem
in America is to increase the amount of deeply subsidized housing
available to the homeless and imminently homeleas. 12 One obvicreated by widespread cutbacks in public assistance programs and benefit levels.
Id. at 77-78. As housing expert Chester Hartman has stated: "To raise incomes
to the point where everyone would have enough money to afford decent housing
at private-market rates would require a piece of social engineering bordering on
a revolution." Sard, Roisman & Hartman, supra note 3, at 108.
11. See generally D. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT (1988). About 25% of single
homeless individuals already work, but cannot afford housing. The United
States Conference of Mayors states: "One-fourth or more of the homeless population were employed in full- or part-time jobs in Alexandria, Boston, Charleston, Charlotte, Denver, New Orleans, Phoenix, and Portland. Fifteen percent or
less were employed in Chicago, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Trenton." MAYORS' REPORT: 1990, supra note 4, at 27. At the 1991 minimum wage
of $4.25 per hour, full-time, year-round minimum wage work yields a gross income of only $8500 per year, or about $700 per month. In 1990, there was no
state where the FMR for a two-bedroom apartment in the state's lowest cost
metropolitan community was less than 40% of full time, minimum wage earnings. See Fair Market Rent Schedules, 56 Fed. Reg. 14733, 14735 (1991); L.
MIHALY, HOMELESS FAMILIES: FAILED POLICIES AND YOUNG VICTIMS 13 (1991)
(published by the Children's Defense Fund). For a discussion of FMR, see supra
note 5. In most states, such an apartment at fair market rent would cost more
than 60% of minimum wage income. L. MIHALY, supra, at 13. For a further discussion of homeless income, see P. RoSSI, supra note 2, at 108-16.
12. Many housing advocates believe that it is preferable, as a policy matter,
to close the income and housing gap from the housing side. They favor programs which subsidize, control and reduce housing costs. These advocates are
skeptical that increased incomes alone will increase housing purchasing power.
They believe that housing owners will respond by increasing housing prices to
further enrich themselves. The costs of producing new housing may prevent
increased incomes from creating sufficient "effective demand" to cause the market to increase the housing supply. Without additional supply, badly needed
decent, new units will not be added to the housing stock and no market mechanism will be created to drive down housing prices. Furthermore, it is likely that
in the long-run, assuming that substantial gaps between incomes and privatemarket housing prices remain, programs which merely subsidize housing costs
will be far more expensive than programs which reduce those costs. Repeated
appropriations of public funds will also be required because such programs do
not increase the stock of publicly-owned housing. Whether increasing incomes
will invariably lead to higher rental costs is a question of fact requiring further
research, but the answer may vary with the degree of concentration of ownership
in the local housing market serving the poor. See Sard, Roisman & Hartman,
supra note 3, at 106; see also INST. FOR POLICY STUDY WORKING ON HOUSING, A
PROGRESSIVE HOUSING PROGRAM FOR AMERICA (1987).
A "deep" subsidy is one that pays the difference between a percentage of

tenant income-now 30% in the federal programs-and the full costs attributable to the housing unit. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(a) (West Supp. 1991). For an
AFDC family with an income of $500 per month (which is higher than the na-
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ous way to accomplish this goal is to legislate an increase in deep
subsidy housing programs and require all or some significant portion of the increased resources to go to the homeless and imminently homeless. 1 3 In light of the enormous shortfall between
housing needs and housing supply, a strategy directed at increasing subsidized housing is vital. This nation cannot end the national disgrace of homelessness without a commitment to
increase substantially the supply of subsidized housing.
However, generating the political will necessary to increase
substantially the supply of deeply subsidized housing is perhaps
as doubtful as the possibility of creating the political will to increase substantially the incomes of the poor. 14 The struggle to
tional average), the tenant's share of rent and utilities would be limited to $150
per month. The remainder of the rent (in the case of private housing) or the
housing cost (in the case of public housing) is paid by the subsidy program. In
contrast, a "shallow" subsidy reduces housing costs by a reduction in the mortgage interest rate, by syndication of tax credits and/or by reduction in the cost
of the land or buildings. See id. § 1437d(d). These shallow subsidies reduce
rental prices in comparison with entirely private market housing, but they cannot bring costs within 30%, or even 50%, of a very poor family's income when
the costs of building or purchasing and operating housing are taken into account. See Sard, Roisman & Hartman, supra note 3, at 105 (nationally, public
housing tenants paying 30% of their incomes for rent contribute less than half
the operating costs for their units).
The growing problem of homelessness in America is evidenced by the
United States Conference of Mayors' Report which states that:
During the past year [1989] requests for emergency shelter increased in the survey cities overall by an average of 24 percent, with
four out of five of the cities registering an increase, 10 percent reporting that the number of requests remained the same, and another 10
percent reporting a decline in requests.
MAYORS' REPORT:

1990, supra note 4, at 2.

13. This simple statement of the "solution" to the income/housing gap
which is driving the homelessness crisis in America does not address the important differences between the various deep subsidy programs. Further, it does
not negate the value of additional shallow subsidies. Shallow subsidies can increase the supply of decent housing. This increased supply can then receive
deep subsidies to house the very poor. The housing needs of working class and
middle income households can also benefit from an increased housing supply.
Programs serving this broader constituency may be the basis of a more effective
political coalition.
14. Housing programs were a frequent target in the Reagan years, with the
annual federal spending per poor person being slashed approximately 30% between 1976 and 1984. D. ELLWOOD, supra note 11, at 40-41. While subsidizing
housing does not raise quite the value conundrums of subsidizing incomes, see
id. at 18-19, there is no national consensus that the government should ensure
minimally adequate housing opportunities. The hope of many housing advocates lies in the possible convergence of interests between low-income households and middle-income citizens who can no longer afford the American dream
of home ownership. Dreier & Appelbaum, American Nightmare: Homelessness, 34
CHALLENGE 46 (Mar.-Apr. 1991). The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (codified at 42
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increase the total supply of deeply subsidized housing continues
in these tight fiscal times. One must analyze, therefore, whether
the existing supply of subsidized housing is being fully utilized
and whether it is going to those legally entitled to and most in
need of such subsidies.' 5 Additional strategies are available to
homeless people and their advocates to increase the proportion
of the existing supply of subsidized housing which goes to the
homeless and imminently homeless. These strategies can result
in virtually immediate housing solutions for at least some of the
homeless. They can also be used by lawyers and others working
with individual homeless clients and client groups to help "solve"
their clients' problems.' 6 This Article will outline six strategies to
maximize access of the homeless and imminently homeless to existing housing subsidies. It will then briefly review some of the
questions raised by such strategies. While this Article necessarily
draws heavily on my experience in Massachusetts, the strategies
should be replicable elsewhere.
II.

A SUBSTANTIAL, ALTHOUGH INSUFFICIENT, NUMBER OF
SUBSIDIES Do EXIST

There are currently three major kinds of deeply subsidized
U.S.C.A. §§ 12,701 - 12,898 (West Supp. 1991) and in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Cranston-Gonzalez Act], the first authorization for major increases in federal housing programs since Reagan was elected,
was finally signed into law in November, 1990. Id. It authorizes $3.086 billion
for housing and homelessness programs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12724. However, no
new funding was appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 1991.
15. Ensuring full utilization of already-funded subsidies is unlikely to cause
any controversy, except perhaps on the part of the private owners and public
housing authorities (PHAs) which have failed to use such subsidies. For further
discussion of the failure of subsidized housing owners and PHAs to utilize available, contracted, federally-funded subsidies, see infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. As the final section of this article briefly discusses, some housing
advocates are opposed to strategies to adopt or enforce preferences. For a discussion of these strategies, see infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. They
believe that it is not worth distinguishing the "most needy" among the many
housing-needy, and/or that such strategies will have a politically divisive effect
on the coalition of groups potentially supportive of increased housing subsidy
programs. Indeed, those who place primary emphasis on mustering political
support for housing programs may prefer to see any possible preference accorded to those who are politically popular, unlike the homeless, in order to
maintain or increase political support for the program.
16. Other potentially valuable litigation and legislative strategies also exist.
These aim to leverage from the entitlement nature of the rights to emergency
shelter or child welfare/foster care services, the legal duty, political need and
financial resources to pay for housing subsidies for the targeted populations.
For an excellent survey of such strategies developed by homeless advocates, see
Roisman, supra note 10, at 73-77; see also, Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare
Reform, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 367 (1988).
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federal housing programs. The first such type of program is the
Section 8 "walk-around" rental subsidies.' 7 These subsidies are
issued by public housing authorities (PHAs), and can be used by
the holder to rent a housing unit of acceptable quality. The second type of deep subsidy program is public housing, which consists of housing units owned and usually managed by a PHA. The
tenant's rent for a public housing unit is limited to thirty percent
of income.' 8 The third type of subsidy is privately owned, federally subsidized developments which have "project-based" subsidies available to some or all of the tenants who move into them.' 9
Some states also fund deep subsidy housing programs which may
20
be similar in program design to the federal programs.
As of 1988, 2.3 million units received Section 8 subsidies,
2
most of which were "walk-around" certificates or vouchers. '
Also as of 1988, 1.4 million public housing units were managed
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (West Supp. 1991). The federally-funded rental
subsidy program is called the "Section 8" program because it appears as § 8 of
the United States Housing Act. A Section 8 "existing housing" subsidy is often
called a "walk-around" subsidy because the holder receives the subsidy certificate from a PHA and then walks around to find a landlord willing to enter into a
contract with the PHA in which the PHA agrees to pay a portion of the rent
equal to the amount beyond 30% of the tenant's income. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437a(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991). For Section 8 certificates, the allowable
total rent is capped at the area FMR plus not more than 10% of the FMR. Id.
§ 1437f(c)(1). For Section 8 vouchers, the PHA share is determined by subtracting 30% of the tenant's income from the applicable FMR. Id.
§ 1437(a)(l)(A). The landlord, however, is allowed to charge, and tenants may
pay, above the FMR. Id. § 1437f(c)(1). For the definition of FMR, see supra note
5.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(a) (West Supp. 1991).
19. Most of the project-based deep subsidies, where the tenant's rent is limited to 30% of income, are now subsidized through one of the Section 8 programs, such as Section 8 New Construction or Section 8 Substantial
Rehabilitation. 24 C.F.R. § 880.101 (1991); 24 C.F.R. § 881.101 (1991). Generally, the private owners maintain the waiting lists and select the tenants for
such developments. However, the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation program
is a hybrid, in which the PHA maintains the waiting list and initially selects applicants for reference to the private owner, who has final decision regarding rental.
24 C.F.R. §§ 882.401, 882.513, 882.514 (1991).
20. In Massachusetts, for example, the state-funded "walk-around" program is authorized by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 1b, §§ 42-44A (West 1986 &
Supp. 1991). Many states have housing finance agencies, which make loans for
housing at below market rates. See The Bond Buyer, Dec. 6, 1982, at 9. However, housing created through such programs is not usually deeply subsidized
unless it is paired with a subsidy funded through another program.
21. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 77. In addition, 203,000 units of privately
owned housing with mortgages subsidized under the "Section 236" program
were receiving Section 8 assistance. Id. For a general discussion of the costs of
housing for the poor, see supra note 3.
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by PHAs.2 2 In addition to the privately owned housing with Section 8 subsidies included above, there are several hundred thousand privately owned units which are deeply subsidized with
23
federal funds through other federal programs.
Each year, Congress appropriates funds for a relatively small
number of new subsidies.2 4 A significant number of units and
subsidies, however, becomes available annually, as current tenants leave or become ineligible for continued subsidy.2 5 In Massachusetts, approximately ten percent of Section 8's turn over
and are available for reissuance each year. 26 The turnover rate
for public housing in Massachusetts appears to be somewhat less:
State officials have estimated that approximately five percent of
public housing units turn over each year. 2 7 There is a much
higher turnover rate at the violence-plagued inner-city projects in
Boston. Extrapolating from these rates, roughly 330,000 federally-funded deep subsidies and deeply subsidized public or privately owned units are available for reassignment each year. 28
Even if all 330,000 deep subsidies were targeted annually to
22. Id. at 78.
23. LEONARD, supra note 3, at 78-79. Some of these are "Section 202" units
for the elderly and handicapped. Further, there are more than 100,000 units of
housing subsidized through Farmers' Home Administration programs which
have deep subsidies. Id.
24. See Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A-2 (Dec. 18, 1986) (discusses
budget cuts at HUD).
25. See Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1991, at El, col. 4 (national survey shows
36% of subsidized units were vacated in 1990).
26. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF COMMUNITIES AND DEv. (EOCD), PERMANENT
HOUSING FOR HOMELESS FAMILIES; A REPORT ON THE COMMONWEALTH RENTAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR HOMELESS AND AT-RISK FAMILIES FY86-FY90 1 n.1

(1989). EOCD's estimate is based on the past experience in the c. 707 program
and in the Section 8 program it administers. Id.
27. See Boston Globe, Jan. 18, 1989, at 19, col. 4 (each year 1,000 out of
13,000 families are placed from waiting list into Boston's 15,000 units). Statefunded public housing units turn over at a rate of at least three to four percent
each year in Massachusetts. Defendants' Amended Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Set of Requests for Admissions on Supplemental Complaint at 15, Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., Civil No.
80109, (Mass., Suffolk Super. Ct. 1990). This estimate does not include the
larger number of federally-subsidized public housing units which are predominantly located in the major urban centers, and which, according to local housing
officials, have a far higher turnover rate.
28. This assumes that the five percent turnover figure for public housing is
applied to approximately 600,000 privately-owned deeply subsidized units as
well as to the 1.4 million public housing units. It also assumes that the 10%
turnover figure is applied to the 2.3 million Section 8 subsidies. Even if this
estimate is high, it must be remembered that it does not include state-funded
subsidies at all. Of course, this estimate of available units will be substantially
undercut if the approximately 200,000 units subsidized through the Section 8
New Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation, or Loan Management Programs

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss5/5

10

Sard: Housing the Homeless through Expanding Access to Existing Subsidi

1991]

HOUSING THE HOMELESS

1123

the homeless and imminently homeless, the supply of affordable
housing would still be grossly inadequate to meet the need.2 9
Nonetheless, such a figure is significant. Ironically, it is more
than sufficient to house the number of homeless estimated by the
Reagan Administration in 1983.30
III.

SIX POTENTIAL STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE ACCESS FOR THE

HOMELESS TO EXISTING HOUSING SUBSIDIES

This article's premise is that a relatively small proportion of
the existing deeply subsidized housing resources which turn over
each year are currently reissued to the homeless or the imminently homeless. 3 ' There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, households with a fairly broad range of incomes are
eligible for federally subsidized housing programs. For all deeply
subsidized federal housing assistance programs, families with inare eliminated from the subsidized housing stock. These units are "at risk" due
to the owners' right to opt-out of their Section 8 contracts by 1994.
29. Some of the deeply subsidized housing developments, both public and
privately owned, were originally restricted by federal law to tenants who were
aged, disabled, or handicapped. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(2)(D) (1978) (amended
1981). Section 573(a) of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act, by amending the definition
of "family," will require that single persons, regardless of whether they are over
62, disabled or handicapped be eligible for federally-assisted housing programs.
Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 573(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
This change will be effective once HUD promulgates implementing regulations,
id., and will remove a very substantial barrier to housing access for a number of
the homeless. However, this provision does not alter the restriction of certain
units or developments to the aged, disabled, or handicapped. Id. While the
homeless and other federal preferences apply in elderly/handicapped public
housing, the categorical eligibility restrictions apply to such housing even if
there are limited numbers of categorically eligible preference holders applying
for admission. Id. For a discussion of preferences regulations, see infra notes
49-66 and accompanying text.
30. P. Rossi, supra note 2, at 37-38. A 1984 HUD study numbered the
homeless at 250,000 to 300,000. Id. Most advocates for the homeless consider
this a gross undercount. Id. Given the difficulties of counting the homeless population, any estimate of the number of homeless is necessarily inaccurate. It is
critical to remember that any such count is made at a single point in time, rather
than assessing the number of people who experience homelessness over the
course of a year. There is very little data on the duration of homelessness
among various sub-populations of the homeless, although such data is critical
for policy and planning purposes.
31. There is no federal data on the number of preference holders on PHA
waiting lists. Interview with Jerry Benoit, HUD Director of Rental Assistance,
(Oct. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Benoit Interview]. Based on available data in Massachusetts, I estimate that only 20% of the turnover of deeply subsidized housing resources are issued to the homeless each year. This includes all state and
federally-funded housing resources, whether controlled by PHA's or by private
owners.
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comes up to fifty percent of the area median income are eligible. 3 2
For many programs, families with even higher incomes are eligible.3 3 While many families nearer the upper end of these income
limits undoubtedly have housing needs, they are unlikely to be
currently or imminently homeless absent housing assistance. Second, Congress has defined the categories of applicants who must
receive preference for federal housing resources far more broadly
than the currently or imminently homeless or displaced, as applicants living in substandard housing or paying more than fifty per34
cent of their income for housing costs also receive preference.
Further, many homeless applicants are frequently excluded
from participation in subsidized housing programs as a result of
problem areas in housing resource distribution described below. 35 These problems may be usefully categorized into six areas
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991). In the Boston area, that
means that a family of three with an annual income of $21,300 is considered to
be in the "very low income" category, and financially eligible for all programs.
33. For example, for federal public housing, families with incomes up to
80% of the area median, or $32,150 for a family of three in the Boston area, are
eligible. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991). Such "low income"
families, as opposed to the "very low income" families with incomes less than
50% of the area median, may receive only 15-25% of public housing units. Id.
§ 1437n.
34. 24 C.F.R. § 882.219 (1991). For a discussion of these preferences, see
infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text. While families living in substandard
housing or paying more than 50% of their income for rent surely have serious,
unmet housing needs, large segments of the population unfortunately continue
in such situations for years without becoming homeless. Indeed, Congress did
not even specify that the homeless were included in the federal preference categories until the enactment of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act. See Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d (West Supp. 1991). For a further discussion
of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act, see supra note 17. Previously, HUD had used its
discretion to include the homeless within the mandated preference category of
those living in substandard housing. See 53 Fed. Reg. 1122, 1134-35 (1988).
35. The doubled-up homeless are largely excluded from federal preference. HUD appears to take the position that such families do not qualify as
homeless under the federal definition, although it is probable that particular
cases do fit within the federal definition based on their sleeping arrangements.
For a further discussion on differing definitions of homeless, see infra note 70.
Consequently, only those doubled-up applicants who, first, became homeless as
a result of owner or other action (which fits within the "involuntarily displaced"
federal preference category), and, secondly, who have not subsequently obtained "standard, permanent, replacement housing," are likely to qualify for
federal preference. See e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 882.219(c) & (d) (1991). However, it
may be possible to prevail on arguments that applicants who are doubled up
may fall within the federal definition of "substandard" housing, particularly
where the living conditions are dramatically more crowded than the federal
Housing Quality Standards would permit. In addition, any doubled-up applicant who is paying more than 50% of income to "rent" his shared living situation should qualify under the rent burden/paying more than 50% of income for
rent and utilities preference category.
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as a focus for challenge or reform. Successful efforts in these areas should result in a substantial increase in the resources allocated to those in dire need:
1) The failure of subsidized housing owners and
PHAs to utilize available, contracted federallyfunded subsidies;
2) the violation of the federal preference rules by
many PHAs and subsidized owners;
3) the failure of most public housing authorities
and subsidized owners to give top priority to
the homeless;
4) the administrative maze through which subsidized housing resources are delivered, requiring literally hundreds of applications to be filed
to maximize the opportunity for a homeless applicant to obtain available resources;
5) procedural barriers erected by the housing authorities and subsidized housing owners, which
impact particularly harshly on the homeless;
and
6) discrimination by many PHAs and subsidized
housing owners against disabled and handicapped applicants who are not mobilityimpaired.
A.

Subsidized Housing Owners and PHA's Fail to Utilize Available,
Contracted Federally-FundedSubsidies

When Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation projects were funded by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the 1970s, HUD entered
into contracts with the owners to subsidize the rent of families in
a specified number of units through the Section 8 program. 36
Each family would pay only the percentage of family income for
rent required under the Section 8 program. 3 7 Rather than utilizing all of these authorized subsidies, owners of an increasing
number of projects have instead been renting what should have
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(2) (1978) (amended 1983). "[T]he secretary is
authorized to make assistance payments pursuant to contracts with owners or
prospective owners who agree to construct or substantially rehabilitate housing
.... Id..

37. Id. § 1437f.
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been subsidized units at market rates. 3 8
Some federal courts erected standing barriers to applicants'
challenges to such under-utilization of subsidies. 3 9 It has been
very difficult to remedy the problem through litigation and to
40
make these already-funded subsidies available to needy families.
Through Section 555 of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act, Congress
has now effectively reversed the prior appellate decision. Owners
are legally obligated to use their full contract authority to rent to
income eligible families. 4 ' Consequently, litigation to enforce the
use of all available subsidies should now be possible. At least sev38. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, 21 HOUSING L. BULL., 48 (1991)
(summarizing provisions of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act). I am unaware of any
estimate of the number of unutilized subsidies nationwide. In one case litigated
by GBLS, a developer was utilizing only 68 of the 108 subsidies called for in its
contract with HUD. Such owners are probably acting out of a variety of motives.
In a strong rental market, owners may be able to demand more for rent than
HUD will pay under the Section 8 contract. Owners may be trying to achieve a
more middle class clientele in their developments simply for the presumed desirability of such tenants. The owners also might anticipate "opting-out" of the
Section 8 contract after 20 years, in the hopes of being able to maximize income
through converting entire developments into market rate rental or condominiums. See Note, Expiring Use Restrictions: Their Impact and Enforceability, 24 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 155, 156 (1989). Congress has sought to address this problem,
albeit imperfectly. See Cranston-Gonzalez Act §§ 601-613 (codified at scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
39. See Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 960 (1988) (plaintiff/applicants were not third-party beneficiaries to
contracts between HUD and private developers and, even if they were, HUD
could modify the contracts without the applicant's consent).
40. GBLS did successfully litigate on behalf of an existing tenant in a development with Section 8 New Construction subsidies. The tenant had been able
to afford a market-rent unit when she became a tenant, but later became disabled and requested a Section 8 subsidy from the owner to avoid being evicted
for non-payment of rent. The owner initially denied that any Section 8 subsidies
were available. GBLS intervention resulted in the discovery of substantial unused contract authority from HUD for Section 8 subsidies and a subsidy was
awarded to the tenant, as well as to some new applicants. The tenant then sued
for damages for the 10 months during which she had been charged market rent,
after she should have been granted a subsidy. The case settled for substantial
damages to the tenant. The agreement is available with names and amounts
redacted (as per agreement) from Steven A. Hitov, GBLS, 68 Essex St., Boston,
MA. 02111.
41. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, supra note 37, at 48. Section 555 of
the Cranston-Gonzalez Act provides: "Any dwelling units in any housing constructed or substantially rehabilitated pursuant to assistance provided under section 8(b)(2) of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as such section existed
before October 1, 1983, and with a contract for assistance under such section,
shall be reserved for occupancy by low-income families and very low-income
families." Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 555, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (historical note)
(West Supp. 1991). It is unclear what effect this provision will have on existing
higher income tenants in units rented at market rate, who are bona fide, albeit
unlawful, tenants of what ought to be subsidized units.
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enty percent of the subsidized units which should become available under this law must go to federal preference holders,
42
including the homeless.
While the Cranston-Gonzalez Act amendments have made it
far more straightforward to achieve full utilization of deep subsidies in privately owned developments, the mere enactment of this
law is unlikely to alter an owner's desire to rent to more affluent
tenants. Thus, enforcement may be necessary to realize the increased availability of subsidies that the law requires. It may be
possible to induce or require a state agency or HUD to undertake
such enforcement work. 4 3 Otherwise, highly laborious work
would be required to determine whether there are unutilized sub44
sidies in any particular development.
Public housing authorities administering Section 8 tenantbased subsidy programs may also have contracted and funded
available Section 8 subsidies that they are unlawfully failing to
distribute. For the last several years, the Worcester (Massachusetts) Housing Authority failed to allocate over 340 Section 8 certificates and vouchers. 4 5 This was approximately thirty percent of
42. Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d (West Supp. 1991).
The federal preference regulations promulgated by HUD, effective July 13,
1988, required that 100% of Section 8 "project-based" subsidies in privately
owned developments be subject to the federal preference regulations. 53 Fed.
Reg. 1122, 1125 (1988). This requirement, however, has been altered. Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 545, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (historical note) (West Supp.
1991). The Act made only 70% of subsidized units subject to the federal preference regulations for tenant selection. Id. The remaining 30% are subject to a
local preference plan to meet local housing needs, which must be developed by
the PHA covering the geographic area, and require public input. Id. For a further discussion of the specifics of this provision, see infra note 55.
43. For example, the General Counsel of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) has agreed to "issue a directive to owners and managers
of Section 8 developments which are financed by the Agency or have Section 8
contracts administered by MHFA to comply with requirements of Section 555 of
the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990." Letter from
Edward T. Pollack, MHFA General Counsel to Steven A. Hitov, Esq., GBLS,
(Jan. 30, 1991). At least in Massachusetts, many projects affected by this section
also are subject to supervision by the state housing finance agency.
44. Data on subsidy utilization should be available from HUD through the
Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), but HUD is
slow to respond, and furthermore may charge for the information. Likely documents to contain the critical information for a subsidy utilization challenge are
the Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contract for each development and the
owner's six-month billing requests to HUD.
45. Letter from Joel Feldman, Esq., Legal Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts, to John Mastropietro, Acting Regional Administrator, HUD
Region 1, (Mar. 5, 1991); letter from Brian McQuade, Executive Director,
Worcester Housing Authority, to John Mastropietro, Acting Regional Administrator, HUD Region 1 (Apr. 4, 1991); letter from Joel Feldman, Esq., Legal
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its total portfolio. 4 6 In mid-1990, the Chelsea (Massachusetts)
Housing Authority decided to stop issuing its available Section 8
subsidies. 4 7 Neither authority turned these funded resources
back to HUD for reallocation to other PHAs who would be willing
to use them. Available federal funds for deep subsidies simply
went unutilized. When legal services attorneys placed the HUD
Regional Office on formal notice of the blatant failure of these
PHAs to comply with federal policy on utilization of contracted
Section 8 resources and, at least in the Chelsea case, the probable
racially discriminatory motivation for such failure, HUD did intervene, without litigation, and required the PHAs to issue and lease
up available subsidies to applicants selected in accordance with
48
federal law.
B.

Violation of the FederalPreference Rules by Many Public Housing
Authorities and Subsidized Owners

Subsidized housing resources were traditionally distributed
with little in the way of recognizable standards. 4 9 In response to
the drastic cutbacks in federal funding for low income housing
which began in the early 1980s, and the shortage of housing resources in relation to need, Congress directed that certain categories of applicant families be given preference over earlier, or
Assistance Corporation of Central Massachusetts, to John Mastropietro, Acting
Regional Administrator, HUD Region 1 (Apr. 26, 1991); letter from John Mastropietro, Acting Regional Administrator, HUD Region 1 to Brian McQuade,
Executive Director, Worcester Housing Authority (May 17, 1991) [hereinafter
Feldman Correspondence].
46. Id.
47. Letter from James M. McCreight, Esq., GBLS Housing Unit, to Marvin
Lerman, Regional Counsel, HUD Region 1 (Dec. 20, 1990); letter from James
M. McCreight, Esq., GBLS Housing Unit, to Susan Cohen, Esq., Attorney for
Chelsea Housing Authority (Dec. 20, 1990); letter from Marvin Lerman, Regional Counsel, HUD Region 1, to James M. McCreight, Esq., GBLS Housing
Unit (Jan. 11, 1991) [hereinafter McCreight Correspondence]. See also Boston
Globe, Apr. 5, 1991, at 22, col. 3 ("Chelsea officials also joined those in Revere,
Lynn and Brockton in endorsing pending legislation that would strip regional
nonprofit agencies of the mandate to distribute and vouchers.").
48. See Feldman Correspondence, supra note 45; McCreight correspondence, supra note 47. The HUD handbook on public housing requires PHAs to
maintain a sustaining occupancy rate of at least 95% of their Section 8 allocations. U.S. DEPT. OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES HANDBOOK FOR THE SECTION 8 EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM
ch. 4, para. 10b (1979).
49. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 264-65 (2d
Cir. 1968). Before the late 1960s, public housing resources were often awarded
on the basis of nepotism, patronage, or some other method based on favoritism
and/or prejudice. Decisions such as Holmes required that waiting lists be kept in
chronological order. See id.
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"standard," applicants not qualifying for preference in the various federal housing programs. 50 In January of 1988, HUD finally
promulgated
regulations
to
implement
these
federal
preferences.5
Under current law, federal preference is given to three categories of applicants: (1) those occupying substandard housing
(including the homeless), (2) those involuntarily displaced, and
(3) those paying more than fifty percent of their income for
rent. 52 The substantial majority of federally-subsidized housing
resources is required to go to applicants qualifying for one of
these preferences. 53 PHAs and owners may use "local" preferences to rank applicants who are federal preference holders. 54 All
applicants qualifying under at least one of the federal preference
categories must come before applicants who do not qualify for
55
federal preference, with minor exceptions.
50. See Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-153, 93 Stat. 1101, § 206 (mandating substandard and involuntary
displacement preferences); Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, § 203 (1984) (added preference for families
paying more than 50% of income for rent).
51. 53 Fed. Reg. 1122, 1122 (1988). PHAs and owners were required to
implement the preferences no later thanJuly 13, 1988. Id. Implementation required notice to all persons on current waiting lists of how they could qualify for
preference status. Id. In addition, all new applicants afterJuly 13, 1988 had to
have their preference status considered under the new preference rules. Id.
52. Cranston-Gonzalez Act §§ 501, 545, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1437d, 1437f
(West Supp. 1991). The Cranston-Gonzalez Act retains the three categories of
federal preferences previously mandated, while specifying that "families that are
homeless or living in a shelter for homeless families" come within the "substandard" preference. Id. § 501, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)(i). For a discussion
of the definitions of homelessness, see supra note 8.
53. The federal preference regulations apply to all tenant-based Section 8
programs. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.219 (1991). They also apply to project-based
subsidies in Section 8 New Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation, Moderate
Rehabilitation, State Housing Agency and several other Section 8 sub-programs.
See 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.613, 881.613, 882.219, 883.714 (1991). For public housing
programs, see 24 C.F.R. §§ 905.305 (Indian housing), 960.211 (1991) (public
housing); for the Rent Supplement Program which provides a deep subsidy to
some units financed through mortgage subsidy programs, see 24 C.F.R.
§§ 215.1 - 290 (1991).
54. For a discussion of preference ranking, see infra note 67-69 and accompanying text.
55. 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a)(7) (1991). Prior to the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, 90% of "walk-around" Section 8 subsidies had
to be awarded to families qualifying for a federal preference. Id.
§ 882.219(b)(2)(ii). However, § 545 of the Cranston-Gonzalez Act reduces the
percentage of project-based Section 8's which must be awarded to families qualifying for a federal preference to 70%, rather than the previous regulatory requirement of 100%. Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 545, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)
(West Supp. 1991); 24 C.F.R. § 880.613(b)(2) (1991). Similarly, § 501 of Cranston-Gonzalez lowered the required percentage of federal preference-qualifying
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Proper implementation of the federal preference regulations
gives preferred status to homeless applicants who meet the federal definition. It is potentially critical to homeless applicants'
achieving relatively quick receipt of a housing subsidy that PHAs
and subsidized owners grant federal preference to those homeless applicants who are entitled to it, and abide by the federal requirement that federal preference holders come before standard
56
applicants.
The only data HUD appears to keep on PHA implementation
of the federal preference regulations is in the individual management audits of particular housing authorities. 57 HUD audits emphasize units or certificates wrongly issued rather than checking
cases of applicants who may have been wrongly denied. 58
The Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS) Homelessness
Unit has two years of experience representing applicants for federal preference at a variety of PHAs and private federally-subsidized owners in Eastern Massachusetts. From this experience, I
believe that there may be widespread violation of the federal preference regulations. 59 For example, in a medium-sized housing
applicants for public housing to 70%. Cranston-Gonzalez § 501, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1437d(c) (West Supp. 1991). This is down from the 90% figure which had
been set by HUD to implement the previous congressional mandates to apply
federal selection preferences to public housing. 24 C.F.R. 960.211(b)(2)(ii)
(1991). HUD has not yet promulgated regulations to implement these statutory
changes in the percent of applicants to whom the federal preference rules must
be applied in the various federally subsidized housing programs.
56. The length of time an otherwise qualified federal preference holder has
to wait for a subsidized housing resource depends on the supply of housing resources, both new and turnover, in relation to the number of federal preference
holders with either earlier application dates and/or higher preference ranking.
For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. In
Massachusetts, homeless applicants generally wait between two and 18 months,
depending on the relative priority given to homeless applicants by the PHA or
subsidized owner and the number of federal preference holders on the particular waiting list. In Boston, as in many other major urban centers, preference
holders, particularly those ranked with the lowest preference, may wait several
years for a Section 8 subsidy or a public housing unit. See Boston Globe, Jan.
18, 1989, at 19, col. 4 (some applicants wait as long as six years).
57. Benoit Interview, supra note 31.
58. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., HUD REPORT: BosTON HOUSING AUTHORITY MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND OCCUPANCY AUDIT

83-84

(Nov. 1990) [hereinafter HUD REPORT].
59. There are no reported cases concerning the application of the federal
preference regulations since their promulgation (in contrast to the failure of
HUD to have issued regulations to implement the statutory amendments). However, few legal services programs have focused attention on preference issues, in
large part because few programs give priority to representing applicants for subsidized housing, as opposed to public or private housing tenants being evicted
from their housing or suffering bad conditions. In addition, it is likely that most
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authority near Boston, GBLS discovered that forty-one percent of
the Section 8 certificates awarded in the first eighteen months after the federal preference regulations went into effect went to
non-federal preference holders. 60 The PHA admitted that it had
federal preference holders on its waiting list at the time.6 '
Such a violation of the fundamental rule of "federal preference holders first" can occur for a variety of reasons beyond the
straightforward legal violation which appears to have occurred at
this PHA. At many PHAs in Massachusetts, GBLS has found that
the PHA's federal preference "system" does not facially comply
with federal law. This is largely because the PHA omits any mention of groups who are mandated by the federal regulations as
federal preference holders, 62 or because it explicitly places some
groups, deemed to have "local" preference but not fitting into
any of the federal preference categories, in a ranking above federal preference holders. 63 We have also found PHAs that deny
cases of incorrect application of preference rules are resolved at the administrative level, as the HUD regulations require that applicants denied preference status be afforded the opportunity for a "meeting" with the PHA or owner. 24
C.F.R. § 882.219(k) (1991). Whether such a "meeting," which has lesser protections than the informal "review" which must be accorded applicants who are
denied eligibility, comports with constitutional due process requirements in
light of the potentially critical effect of a preference determination on the likelihood of receipt of subsidized housing, is a question that no court has yet decided. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.216(a) (1991). There is no federally provided right
of judicial review of preference determinations. However, it appears virtually
certain that a challenge to a denial of a federal preference, at least by a PHA,
could be brought in federal court as well as in a state court of general jurisdiction. See Pruticka v. Posner, 714 F. Supp. 119, 124 (D.N.J. 1989) (local housing
authority has obligation to implement congressional preference guidelines);
Drake v. Pierce, 691 F. Supp. 264, 275 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (HUD conduct found
illegal when it approved housing plans that did not comport with statutory preferences), summary judgment granted, 698 F. Supp. 1523 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
60. Letter from Tony Pereira, Director of Applications, Brookline Housing
Authority, to Barbara Sard, (Feb. 15, 1990).
61. Id.
62. In light of the GBLS Homelessness Unit's mandate to serve the homeless, it has paid particular attention to the omission of homeless applicants from
PHA preference plans. GBLS has found that the Chelsea Housing Authority
omitted any mention of homeless applicants from its application forms and applicant information material, although the homeless were included in the formal
plan submitted to HUD. Fall River and Waltham Housing Authorities are
among those which have omitted groups of the homeless from their federal preference categories. The housing authorities limited the federal preferences to
categories of "no-fault" homeless without any HUD approval for an altered definition. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.219(a)(3) (1991). The Revere Housing Authority
plan granted federal preference status only to those federal preference holders
who were also local residents. HUD had approved this plan until GBLS submitted a written complaint to HUD, at which point HUD required the PHA to alter
its plan to conform with federal law.
63. The Quincy and Revere Housing Authority plans placed categories of
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federal preference status to applicants who come within the fed64
eral definitions.
These practices result in applicants who are legally entitled
to federal preference status being denied such status, and in all
likelihood, also being denied subsidized housing. Such practices
also make it possible for applicants without federal preference to
obtain more of the available subsidies. In addition, if a PHA
closes its waiting list for Section 8 applicants when its waiting list
contains any standard applicants, or if it has a ranked preference
system and its list contains applicants with less than first preference, it is likely that the PHA is unlawfully denying the right of an
applicant claiming federal preference status to be placed on the
waiting list.65 As a consequence of such unlawful closing, applicants entitled to federal preference status are substantially
delayed in receiving housing assistance or are totally denied such
assistance.
Aggressive representation of applicants for subsidized housing resources can remedy these violations and enforce homeless
applicants' rights as federal preference holders. However, it
would be more efficient if HUD more seriously assumed its role as
grantor of federal funds. Actions may otherwise have to be
local residents without federal preference status above federal preference holders, without any limitation to the 10% "local" preference then permitted by federal law.
64. We have generally been able to prevail in such cases at an administrative hearing. In one unreported case which required filing of a lawsuit against
the PHA, our client, a mentally disabled woman who was imminently, but not yet
homeless, was a tenant in an illegal Single Room Occupancy (SRO) building.
She paid most of her SSI check for rent. Nonetheless, the PHA denied her federal preference under the "rent burden" or paying more than 50% of income
for rent category, apparently because the PHA did not consider payment for an
illegal SRO to be "rent." Under pressure from the federal judge at a pre-trial
conference the PHA settled. This settlement included paying our client damages of more than the difference between the rent she was paying and what her
rent in public housing would have been if she not been denied preference status.
It also reserved the issue of whether GBLS could recover attorneys' fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). See Periello v. Medford Hous. Auth., Civil No. 9012561-Z (D. Mass. 1991).
65. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a)(7) (1991). Section 882.209(a)(7) appears to
authorize the practice of PHAs closing their waiting lists for Section 8 subsidies.
Id. Yet, it actually prohibits PHAs from closing their lists to applicants claiming
federal preference when there is anyone on the list of lower (or no) preference
status than the applicant being denied the ability to apply. Id. It is still a common practice for PHAs to open their Section 8 list for a few days or months and
then close the list until all the eligible persons who applied within the arbitrary
"window," or at least the preference holders who applied within such window,
are served. This probably violates the rights of homeless applicants qualifying
for federal preference status to be permitted to apply for and receive a subsidy
prior to applicants with lower or no federal preference right.
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brought against a very large number of PHAs, with the possibility
for class or group defendant actions. More aggressive congressional supervision could induce such action on HUD's part. It
could also be a worthwhile strategy to sue HUD for failing to
properly implement the federal housing laws in situations where a
violation of the federal preference rules has a racially discrimina66
tory effect.
C.

Failure of Most Public Housing Authorities and Subsidized Owners
to Give Top Priority to the Homeless

Those agencies and owners administering federally subsidized housing programs have the authority, under the HUD regulations, to rank the federal preference categories. 6 7 Homeless
applicants would benefit substantially if homelessness were
ranked as the top preference category. 68 Public housing authori66. See, e.g., NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514, 527 (1st Cir.
1979), on remand sub nom. NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361,
365 (D. Mass. 1989) (HUD found liable when it "did not condition its provision
of federal funds . . . on construction of affordable integrated public housing").
67. 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.219(b)(2)(iii), 880.613(b)(2) (1991). This ranking can
be an ordering of entire federal categories, parts of categories or of persons
qualifying for federal preference who also meet a local preference category, such
as residency, veterans' status or some other PHA or state-determined qualification, so long as the ranking system does not interfere with fair housing duties.
For a discussion of the applicable law governing preference requirements, see
supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text. HUD has noted that a PHA's discretion to determine such ranking is not unlimited and that a PHA must demonstrate to HUD that it has the administrative capacity to make the complex caseby-case determinations that are required by a ranking system with many narrowly-defined categories. Memorandum from Lawrence Golberger, Director,
HUD Office of Elderly and Assisted Housing, to David T. Forsberg, Regional
Administrator & Housing Commissioner (May 9, 1990). In addition, PHA's exercise of its discretion to rank preference categories, particularly by giving additional weight to "local" applicants with federal preferences over other
preference holders, must not violate the fair housing requirements of Title VII
of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
68. Similar benefit probably would result even if homeless applicants were
ranked after those involuntarily displaced. There is a relatively small number of
applicants displaced by natural forces, urban renewal-type activities, owners taking the property off the rental market, or abuse. In most jurisdictions, the largest group of preference applicants is likely to be those paying more than 50% of
income for rent. An elaborate example of a type of "homeless first" ranking
system is what the Massachusetts state housing agency, EOCD, has established
for the 13,000 federal Section 8 subsidies it administers through a network of
regional non-profit agencies. SinceJuly of 1988, EOCD has had in effect various
plans for ranking the federal preferences which have given first preference to
those deemed homeless "through no fault of their own." The current preference rules, in effect since July of 1990, give first preference to eight narrowly
defined groups of applicants deemed to be not at fault for their homelessness, as
well as to seven narrow groups of applicants deemed to be imminently at risk of
homelessness. In addition, first preference may be given to homeless applicants
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ties could also require that the homeless receive all or most of the
thirty percent of units with project-based assistance for which
they have discretion to set local, non-federal preference for
69
admission.
HUD does not keep any centralized records, and it issues no
reports of what preference systems have been adopted by PHAs.
Thus, we don't know the percentage of PHAs or owners administering federal housing resources who accord top preference to
the homeless within a ranked preference system. If the Massachusetts experience is typical, most PHAs and private owners of federally subsidized units do not rank the federal preferences at all.
Of those that do have a ranked system, the homeless were ranked
first in few cases.
There are two approaches to accomplishing top ranking of
homeless applicants for federal housing resources in particular
areas: Persuasion or mandate. Persuasion may be grounded on
public policy/relative need arguments alone.7 0 It may also be enwho do not fit within the narrowly defined categories if, in the judgment of the
administering agency, the applicant was not at fault for their homelessness or
can demonstrate mitigating circumstances. Some local housing authorities in
Massachusetts have adopted similar preference systems for their federal resources. This targeting, even with all the problems inherent in the definitional
limitations, has resulted in nearly all of the EOCD administered turnover and
new Section 8 subsidies going to homeless or, recently, imminently homeless
applicants. This is in spite of the problems inherent in the definitional limits.
The proportion of Section 8 subsidies administered by local housing authorities
going to homeless applicants has also increased. Data compiled from GBLS's
clients' experience and a survey done by the Massachusetts Coalition for the
Homeless of shelter and housing advocates working with homeless families in
state-funded shelters show that the waiting time for homeless applicants qualifying for first preference at one of the EOCD non-profit administering agencies
ranges from approximately four to 18 months. This waiting period depends on
requested bedroom size and the number of qualified first preference applicants
in relation to the number of resouces.
69. Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 545, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (West Supp. 1991).
PHAs will now set the preferences governing the 30% of awarded units exempt
from the federal preference rules in privately owned developments within their
jurisdiction. Id. § 545(c), 42 US.C.A. § 1437f (historical note) (West Supp.
1991). This provision's effect is particularly unclear where there are PHAs with
overlapping jurisdiction over a particular geographical area. For example, the
Massachusetts state housing agency is also a PHA operating a statewide Section
8 program.
70. A PHA may also decide, based on its policy view and/or what it perceives as the particular needs in its area, to request that HUD approve an altered
definition of "homeless." See 24 C.F.R. § 960.21 l(a)(2) (1991). If the PHA does
not request an altered definition, it must comply with HUD's definition. Id. The
Boston Housing Authority (BHA) categorizes as homeless those applicants who
are doubled-up in the home of another as well as those who sleep in shelters or
in the street. Such "homeless" applicants receive second preference. Only certain applicants facing court-ordered evictions and displacement by natural disas-
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hanced by a fiscal "incentive." This occurs when the costs of
emergency shelter are reduced by targeting housing resources at
the families who would otherwise be sheltered at enormous state
expense. 7' A mandate can be achieved through administrative
rule-making, a supervisory state housing agency, legislation, 72 or
ter and code enforcement receive first preference. HUD has recently taken the
position, despite its previous approval of the BHA preferences, that such
doubled-up families do not come within the federal definition of "homeless."
HUD notified BHA that BHA will either have to seek federal approval for an
altered definition or use its "local" preference share to serve doubled-up applicants. BHA is both disputing HUD's finding, arguing that doubled-up applicants do come within the federal definition of "homeless," and, simultaneously,
seeking HUD approval for an altered definition of homeless. BHA wants to continue to use its 10% local preference for applicants who were evicted for nonpayment when they were paying between 40 and 50% of their income for rent.
HUD REPORT, supra note 58, at 84-85. Such an expansion of the federal definition of "homeless" could be enormously beneficial. Many extremely housingneedy applicants are doubled up, with the reluctant agreement of family or
friends, rather than choosing to sleep in shelters or on the streets, either because of the lack of available housing or shelters, or because of repugnant conditions in shelters.
71. This has certainly been the case in Massachusetts. State law requires
that families without "feasible alternative housing" receive temporary emergency shelter. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 18, § 2(D) (West Supp. 1991). The
cost of this temporary emergency shelter averages $2700 per month and the
shelter cannot be terminated merely due to the passage of time. Massachusetts
Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., 400 Mass. 806,
820-22, 511 N.E.2d 603, 612-13 (1987). In Massachusetts Coalitionfor the Homeless, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that while it is desirable to
move families from transient shelters into more permanent housing as quickly as
possible, the Superior Court judge erred when he enjoined the Department of
Public Welfare "from placing AFDC families in hotels, motels and emergency
shelters for more than a total of ninety days." Id. Subsequently, based on a
renewed prayer for preliminary relief in a supplemental complaint, the trial
judge entered a preliminary injunction against a 90-day limit on emergency shelter benefits for families. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary
of Human Servs., Civil No. 80109 (Mass. Suffolk Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1990).
72. Frank Keating, General Counsel of HUD, stated: "We find nothing in
the United States Housing Act of 1937 or other Federal law which would constitute a legal impediment to PHAs following State-directed preferences for the
homeless . . . " Letter from Frank Keating, General Counsel of HUD, to Alex
Bledsoe, then Deputy Secretary of EOCD (Jan. 12, 1990). The letter also stated
that whether a state housing agency, rather than a state legislature, could impose
such state-required preference for the homeless on PHAs was a question of
state, not federal law. Id. The Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless filed
legislation in the 1991 legislative session to create a state program of "transitional rental allowances" for homeless families in state-supported shelters. H.R.
1767, 177th Gen. Ct., 1991 Mass. (introduced February 5, 1991 and currently in
House Committee on Ways and Means); S. 455, 177th Gen. Ct., 1991 Mass.
(introduced January 30, 1991 and currently in Senate Committee on Ways and
Means). Funds would be those otherwise spent for such shelters. The legislation would require PHAs to grant first preference to such families who were
otherwise eligible for state or federal housing programs. Id.
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court order. 73 Politics will probably dictate whether administrative or legislative advocacy is likely to be fruitful in a particular
state. To the author's knowledge, no court has issued such a
mandate. However, it is within a court's equitable power to do so
where executive branch liability for homelessness of a particular
group has been found, and where appropriated funds are available to fashion a remedy.
D. Balkanized Administration of Subsidized Housing Programs
When a person in the United States wishes to apply for Social
Security benefits, he or she goes to the Social Security Administration office serving the local area.7 4 The benefits the person is
eligible to receive are the same regardless of where the person
lives. 75 The time it takes to'receive benefits post-application is
unlikely to vary based on where the person applies. The same
situation occurs for persons wishing to apply for unemployment
compensation or public assistance benefits, although the benefits
76
vary in each state.
In contrast to virtually all these other major governmental
benefit programs for individuals, anyone wishing to apply for subsidized housing has to make literally hundreds of applications in
any particular state in order to maximize the chances of receiving
benefits. This can be true even in a state where the only subsi73. On remand from the decision in Massachusetts Coalitionfor the Homeless,
plaintiffs are currently seeking an order requiring the defendant state officials
(the Secretaries of Administration and Finance, EOCD, the Executive Office of
Human Services (EOHS) and the Commissioner of the Department of Public
Welfare (DPW)) to submit to the court a proposed plan to maximize the coordination between the emergency shelter programs for homeless families and the
subsidized housing programs. See Supplemental Complaint & Prayer for Relief,
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Servs., Civil
No. 80109 (Mass., Suffolk Super. Ct.) (filed February 1990), on remandfrom 400
Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603 (1987). The emergency shelter programs are administered by DPW and supervised by EOHS. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18, § 2(D)
(West Supp. 1991). The subsidized housing programs are under the Secretary
of EOCD. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23B, § 3 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991).
Plaintiffs are seeking to make available the maximum possible number of subsidized housing units and rental subsidies to families in DPW-funded shelters who
have been homeless for more than 90 days, within already appropriated fund
limits and in the shortest possible time, in keeping with the prior decision of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Massachusetts Coalitionfor the Homeless,
400 Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603.
74. See U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., 54 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN (1991).
75. Id.
76. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at A20, col. 3.
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dized housing programs are federally-funded. 77
Such balkanized distribution of a basic resource is a product
of the localized system of funding conduits established by Congress for federal housing dollars. In the first thirty years of federal housing programs, funding essentially went into public
housing programs through contracts with public housing authorities established pursuant to state law. 78 Thejurisdiction of a PHA

generally follows city or town lines, although regional or even
statewide PHAs are possible. 7 9 There are approximately 2,000
PHAs that administer a federal Section 8 program. 0 In some
states, an applicant must file separate applications at literally hundreds of PHAs to maximize his or her chance of receiving a "walkaround" Section 8 subsidy8 l even though such subsidies can now
be used anywhere in the state (and in some contiguous areas of
neighboring states). 82 Complicating matters further, PHAs frequently require a separate application to be filed for their public
housing and Section 8 project-based programs, in addition to the
application for "walk-around" Section 8 certificates and vouchers.
Then, in addition to the hundreds of PHAs at which one might
wish to submit one or several applications (to receive a "projectbased" subsidized unit at one of the potentially hundreds of privately owned, federal or state-subsidized developments in the
83
area), a separate application must be made to each project.
77. For a discussion of this application problem, see infra notes 90-100 and
accompanying text.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1978) (amended 1988).
79. Some states, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana and possibly others, have established a state-wide PHA. In Massachusetts, the purpose is
to administer federal Section 8 and state-funded housing subsidies with statewide mobility. This was prior to such statewide "portability" being required by
federal law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(r)(1) (West Supp. 1991). While this is a
laudable goal, the state-wide PHA was established in addition to the local housing authorities, rather than instead of them. One consequence is a layer of eight
regional agencies that administered the Section 8 program for the state PHA on
top of the 240 local housing authorities which administer state and/or federal
resources for a state as small as Massachusetts.
80. Benoit Interview, supra note 31.
81. The number of PHAs administering Section 8 programs is not evenly
distributed throughout the states. In Massachusetts, approximately 120 PHAs
administer a federal Section 8 program. The Massachusetts pro-rata share
would be 40 if there were the same number of PHAs in each state.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(r) (West Supp. 1991).
83. A city or state could alter this situation and establish a mechanism for
submitting applications in some central location. This procedure would not violate owners' rights under federal law to make the tenant selection decision,
although current federal regulations could possibly be interpreted to give to
owners the exclusive right to accept applications as well as to make tenant selection decisions. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.603 (1991) ("The owner must accept appli-
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Thus, there are hundreds of PHAs or private developments
one should apply to in order to maximize the chances of receiving
a housing subsidy. Furthermore, each PHA or private developer
is permitted by federal law to adopt its own system for ranking the
federal preferences.8 4 State-funded resources may be distributed
under different rules than the federal preferences. While PHA
plans and rules are technically publicly available, 5 there is no one
place to get them. No governmental agency gathers them all and
no governmental agency is required to collect turnover and waiting list information. Consequently, it is impossible for a homeless applicant, desperate for housing, to act like the proverbial
rational person and apply at those agencies/developments where
she is likely to have the best chance of receiving housing, in light
of the fit between her circumstances and the applicable tenant selection rules, as well as the relative availability of new or turnover
resources in the bedroom size she needs.
While major urban centers may have waiting lists that are
years long (even for federal preference holders), 6 the experience
in Massachusetts has been that PHAs in smaller communities frequently have relatively few federal preference holders on their
waiting lists. A homeless applicant legally entitled to preference
may be able to receive a housing subsidy fairly quickly from an
outlying community, in the suburban ring or even in a distant rural area. A Section 8 "walk-around" subsidy can then be used to
rent housing in the urban area of origin or any other community
cations for admission to the project .... ). Since federal law does not establish
any such central or regional mechanism, in the absence of any requirement of
state or local law, separate applications must now be submitted to each
development.
84. For a discussion of preference rankings, see supra notes 67-69.
85. 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d)(2) (1991). All of the PHAs tenant selection
plans must be filed with the regional HUD field office. The plans could be obtained through a Federal Freedom of Information Act request. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1988). The tenant selection policies and procedures used by PHAs
in their public housing programs must be posted in each PHA office and made
available to an applicant or tenant upon request. Id.; 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(d)(2)
(1991). PHAs generally use the same federal preferences for their public housing and their Section 8 programs, although they do follow different tenant selection procedures in each program. Section 8 tenant selection policies and
procedures must be contained in a PHA's Administrative Plan for Section 8. 24
C.F.R. § 882.204(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HUD Regional Office may have the tenant
selection plans used by private owners administering Section 8 project-based
subsidies. It must publicly make those plans available. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)
(1988).

86. For further discussion, see, I.

SHAPIRO
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87
in the state to which the person wishes to move.
While federal law permits this balkanized "system" of distributing federal housing resources, it does not require it. States
could require all PHAs and private owners with federally-subsidized resources to comply with a state-ordered system for ranking
federal preference holders. States could also require PHAs and
owners to submit information about the likely availability of units
to a central or regional clearinghouse. Litigation could provoke
them to mandate such reporting. 88 States could also reduce the
barriers created by balkanized administration by requiring PHAs
and private subsidized owners to accept applications by mail and
to use the same application form. This could then be photocopied and sent out to the long list of distributors of subsidized
housing resources. 89

87. For example, some homeless families from Eastern Massachusetts applied to the PHA in the small Western Massachusetts town of Williamstown.
They were assisted by a DPW-provided housing search worker. DPW provides
workers to families in DPW-funded emergency shelters to help them negotiate
the maze of housing agencies and rules. The families had heard that the PHA
had Section 8's available and no preference holders on their waiting list. The
homeless families received Section 8 subsidies in a fairly short space of time and
were able to use them to rent apartments in Eastern Massachusetts. This use of
the Section 8 certificates was facilitated by the enactment of Cranston-Gonzalez.
Cranston-Gonzalez Act § 551, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(r) (West Supp. 1991) (making Section 8 certificates portable anywhere in state, not only between contiguous metropolitan areas). The amendment was inserted by Representative Frank
at the request of the attorney for the homeless families, Judith Liben of the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (MLRI). This portability feature of Section 8
subsidies is a critical value for those urban minority families wishing to integrate
the suburbs. See Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 451, 473-74 (1988) (discussing attempts to integrate new construction by
Chicago Housing Authority into suburban and white areas).
88. States could take such actions based on their legal authority under state
law to direct PHAs and private owners administering federally-subsidized housing in a manner consistent with federal law. Their reason for acting could be
part of an anti-homelessness strategy, a remedy for racial discrimination, or any
other legitimate reason. The Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless is currently pursuing such a clearinghouse as a remedy for alleged violations by the
state welfare agency of its declared duty to provide homes, and not merely shelters, for AFDC recipients and alleged violations by the state housing agency of
its statutory mandate to coordinate emergency and transitional housing programs. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 23B, § 3 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). For a
discussion of the Supplemental Complaint currently pending in Massachusetts Coalitionfor the Homeless, see supra note 73.
89. GBLS and MLRI have drafted a bill on behalf of the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, a portion of which would make such changes in PHA
admissions procedures. MCH may pursue a similar remedy against private subsidized owners in Boston through a local ordinance because sufficient simplification of admissions procedures was not secured in the NAACP v. Kemp litigation.
For a discussion of this case, see supra note 66. Housing authorities in Massachusetts are required to mail applications to would-be applicants, and PHAs and
private developments subsidized by the state housing finance agency are re-
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While such state-level strategies only tinker with the federally-created balkanized system, which can be best altered by
changing federal law, implementation of clearinghouses and
streamlined application processes should help illuminate the
sharp inconsistency between the nature of current housing subsidy programs, in which approximately half of the resources are
portable income subsidies, and the outdated, localized manner in
which housing resources are now distributed. Such reforms
should also serve to highlight the need for change.
E.

ProceduralBarriers Erected by PHA

Achieving access to existing subsidized housing resources requires surmounting a number of procedural barriers which create
particular difficulty for the homeless. First, PHAs frequently refuse to take any applications for their Section 8 programs (even
from federal preference holders) on the grounds that their lists
are "closed." 90 Second, people who do manage to get their
names on the waiting list are frequently "purged" for failure to
respond to a letter sent to an old address. 9 ' This occurs even
though the PHA had no resource to offer the person at the time
the letter was sent but was simply "updating" its list. Third, those
who do make it through to the eligibility determination process
confront a seemingly endless stream of verification requirements
which inevitably winnows down the number of applicants able to
complete the course. 9 2 Homeless persons often cannot compete
in this "paper chase." Finally, the notices and appeal procedures
quired by state regulation to accept applications by mail. MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
760, § 5.06(1) (1989); MASSACHUSETrs HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, MHFA HANDBOOK para. 15D(4) (1986).
90. For a discussion of waiting list practices, see supra note 68.
91. See Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1988, at D7, col. 3 (applicants were
dropped from list after failing to respond to three requests to update their
applications).
92. One of the GBLS Homeless Unit's earliest clients presented a perfect
example of the type of "Catch-22" which PHA verification requirements often
create. Our client had been homeless for two years. His Single Room Occupancy (SRO) building owner had abandoned the building and it was subsequently condemned. His hometwon PHA was in a working class suburb outside
of Boston, which required him to provide verification from his former landlord
of his suitability as a tenant before they would approve him for public housing.
He could not provide this verification because his landlord was gone; the landlord's abandonment was why he had become homeless. Our office intervened
and threatened to sue if the PHA didn't at least issue a decision on our client's
eligibility based on his having provided all of the requested verification which he
could. The PHA accepted our client as a tenant and he was housed within 10
days.
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used by many PHAs and private subsidized owners lack the basic
rudiments of due process. Applicants, therefore, are frequently
unable to effectively utilize the appeal process to vindicate their
right to receive subsidized housing resources.
None of these procedural barriers are required by federal
law, although some, such as the purging of the lists, appear to be
encouraged by HUD. 93 Other barriers may be motivated in part
by concerns of administrative efficiency. None was designed explicitly to exclude the homeless. 9 4 Unfortunately, PHAs are following in the steps of other bureaucracies seeking to limit the
number of applicants found eligible, without publicly admitting
that they are narrowing the eligibility rules. The effect is that the
perceived need for subsidized housing is substantially less than
95
the reality.
By creating such procedural hurdles, PHAs may be purposely
trying to exclude those unable to negotiate the obstacle course.
These are the least literate, the least articulate, the least mobile
(to get around to the required verification sources) and those
without stable addresses. These people are likely to be the
poorest of the applicants, disproportionately language and/or racial minorities and the handicapped. 96 Such exclusionary tactics
93. U.S.

DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING HANDBOOK

7465.1 Rev-2, § 2-3 (1979). The handbook recommends annual updates of the
waiting list to determine if the applicant is still interested in housing. Id. The
HUD Management Review Report criticized the Boston Housing Authority for
failure to perform such annual updates. HUD REPORT, supra note 58, at 81.
94. For example, homeless advocates who assisted homeless applicants for
public housing at the Boston Housing Authority became aware that homeless
applicants in particular were adversely affected by BHA verification requirements. BHA required that applicants list all of their "residences" in the prior
five years and provide verifications other than from relatives from each location.
Most homeless applicants have stayed in a very large number of places over a
short period of time. Most have also stayed with relatives for some period of
time before resorting to shelter or the streets. These requirements, which
originated prior to the current homeless crisis, particularly adversely affected
the homeless. This problem, among others, was brought to the BHA's attention
in on-going discussions about improving access to BHA's housing for the homeless. The BHA official in charge readily conceded that BHA had never looked at
their admission practices from the perspective of the homeless, despite the fact
that a very large proportion of BHA applicants currently are homeless. The
BHA agreed to alter many of these adverse practices.
95. The history of such practices in the welfare system is well-documented.
See, e.g., Brodkin & Lipsky, Quality Control in AFDC as an Administrative Strategy, 57
Soc. SERVICE REV. 1, 11 (1983) (strict verification requirements before applications accepted; strict deadline requirements terminated assistance to those
needing help in the application process); Leiwant & Hasen, Caselaw on AFDC
Verification Problems, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 215 (1987).
96. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing Bureaucratic Disentitlement, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 591, 594-97 (1987-1988). If the manner in
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may be motivated simply by localism-a desire not to distribute
scarce housing resources to people not seen as "theirs" 9 7and/or by racial or class prejudice. Advocates for the housingneedy and the homeless should expose such policies as having no
proper place in government-funded housing programs and
98
should work to eliminate them.
These procedural barriers are all subject to legal challenge. 99
They could also be altered by state-level rulemaking or legislation, as briefly suggested above, or by changes in federal regulations or statute. Such changes would benefit not only homeless
applicants, but all applicants for public and subsidized housing
resources. Why have few such challenges been brought? Probably because subsidized housing admissions issues have not been a
primary focus of legal effort since initial, basic reforms were accomplished in the late 1960s and early 1970s, after federallyfunded legal services were first available. These reforms include
waiting lists, proscribing arbitrary exclusions of classes of potentially eligible applicants and rudimentary notice and hearing
requirements.10 0
which a public assistance program is administered has a disproportionate negative impact on the handicapped, a claim may be stated under 29 U.S.C.A. § 794
(West Supp. 1991). It may also be stated under applicable local law. See Rensch
v. Board of Supervisors, No. C595155 (Cal., L.A. County Super. Ct.); City of Los
Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, No. C655274 (Cal., L.A. County Super. Ct.).
For discussion of Rensch, see Blasi, supra, at 596 (discussing bureaucratic impediments that can be implemented to restrict access to entitlement programs, even
among those eligible for their benefits).
97. This view is common despite the fact that Section 8 and public housing
are entirely federally funded, and few localities contribute their own funds to
PHAs. An exception to this is the property-tax exemption for federally-funded
public housing.
98. Depending on particular local conditions, claims based on racial discrimination law could result in remedies which increase the supply of subsidized
housing resources in the community, and increase access to existing resources.
See Roisman & Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunitiesfor Poor People of Color: Recent Developments in Federaland State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
312, 328-29 (1990).
99. In addition to possible challenges based on discriminatory effect, these
procedural barriers could be challenged on due process principles, under the
fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see
Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982) (applicants for Section 8 subsidies do receive protection of the due process clause).
100. See e.g., Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1968) (lack of any objective procedures under which a housing authority doles
out housing held in violation of due process); Davis v. Toledo Metro. Hous.
Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (evidentiary hearing required when
an applicant has been declared ineligible for public housing); Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (applicant
cannot be denied access to housing by a housing authority solely on the basis of
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From the perspective of clients who are hobsing-desperate,
overcoming these procedural barriers, particularly after the implementation of the federal preferences, is often the means to
solving the clients' most critical problem. Such advocacy can help
numerous individual clients as well as applicants overall. It can
also eliminate structural barriers to homeless applicants' being
able to benefit equally from publicly-funded housing programs.
F. DiscriminationAgainst Non-Mobility Impaired Disabled and
HandicappedApplicants
A significant proportion of the homeless meet the federal
definitions of "disabled" or "handicapped."' '0 1 This is particularly true of homeless people without minor children. They meet
the basic "categorical" eligibility requirement which federal law
had in effect until October 1, 1991, on single applicants for housing. These people are also eligible for special "elderly/handicapped" housing resources, 0 2 in addition to "family"
10 3
housing.
her status as a welfare recipient); Thomas v. Hous. Auth. of Little Rock, 282 F.
Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (applicant cannot be denied housing solely on the
basis of her status as an unwed mother). See generally THE NATIONAL HOUSING
LAw PROJECT, HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS' RIGHTS ch. 2 (1985).
101. 42 U.S.C.A. § .1437a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991) (defining disabled and
handicapped). Federal law has, until October 1, 1991, generally limited public
and subsidized housing resources to "families" which are households of two or
more unless one member is 62 or older, disabled or handicapped. Id. Some
federally-subsidized developments are restricted to elderly, disabled, or handicapped households. For further discussion of these programs, see supra note 29.
For Congress's definition of "handicap" in the Fair Housing Amendments of
1988, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(h) (West Supp. 1991). The definition of "handicap" in § 3602(h) is substantially preferable for the handicapped homeless and
probably applies to federally subsidized housing programs despite the less
favorable definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991). See 24 C.F.R.
100.201 (1991).
Approximately one-third of the single adult homeless are estimated to suffer from severe mental illness. See National Resource Center on Homelessness
and Mental Illness, Exploring Myths About "Street People," 2 ACCESS 2 (1990). An
additional small number suffer from other non-mobility-impairing disabling or
handicapping conditions other than alcohol or drug addiction. P. Rossi, supra
note 2, at 42. Various studies have estimated that approximately one-third of
the single adult homeless suffer from substance abuse. Id. at 42-43. Some of
these people also suffer from chronic, severe mental illness. Id. at 43.
102. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(p) (West Supp. 1991) (shared housing for elderly and handicapped).
103. In addition to federally funded resources, states may also fund socalled "elderly/handicapped" housing. In Massachusetts, there are more than
30,000 units of state-funded public housing which are restricted to the elderly
and handicapped by state law. This is mandated under what are known in Massachusetts as the Chapter 667 and 689 programs enacted by 1954 Mass. Acts
667 and 1974 Mass. Acts 689, respectively. A significant number of very poor,
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Some local housing authorities and private subsidized owners have unlawfully restricted "elderly/handicapped" housing to
the elderly and the mobility-impaired handicapped who need the
alleged "special amenities" of such housing. In doing so, they
have prohibited access to other handicapped and disabled persons. 10 4 These unlawful practices have resulted in subsidized
housing units remaining vacant in some areas because applicants
aged sixty-two and over may not wish to go into the available
units because of the neighborhood in which they are located. 10 5
Based on their circumstances, relatively few elderly applicants are
entitled to federal preference' 0 6 compared with the actually
housing desperate families with children also qualify as handicapped under federal housing law because the family's "head" or "spouse" qualifies as handicapped. See 24 C.F.R. § 812.2 (1991). Such families should therefore be
considered for admission to "elderly/handicapped" housing. They are often excluded because their family size requires a unit of more than two bedrooms.
Such units rarely exist in such housing. Consequently, they are forced to wait on
the much longer "family" housing lists, despite the congressional decision to
make housing more available for handicapped families than for others. If the
type of housing built by PHAs and private subsidized owners results in depriving
such handicapped families with children of their rights under federal law, such
families may have a claim that their rights under federal fair housing law are
being violated on two counts: as handicapped, and, as families with children. 42
U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) & (0(2) (West Supp. 1991).
104. Such restriction violates federal anti-discrimination law. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(2) (West Supp. 1991); 24 C.F.R. § 100.1-100.65(a) (1991). It
may violate applicable state law as well. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.

151B, § 4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). See generally, MENTAL HEALTH LAw PROJECT, RIGHTS OF TENANTS WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES, CONSUMERS AND LANDLORDS

(1990). Some cases decided prior to the Federal Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988 upheld exclusion of the non-elderly from so-called "202" (named after
§ 202 of the National Housing Act of 1982) privately-owned, federally-subsidized housing. See, e.g., Knutzen v. Nelson, 617 F. Supp. 977 (D. Colo. 1985)
(housing authority can deny housing to applicant who is not member of targeted
group), aff'd sub nom. Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Center, 815 F.2d
1343 (10th Cir. 1987). It is questionable whether such cases are still good law.
HUD Region 1 recently took the position that the prohibition on familial status
discrimination means that a development cannot exclude families with children
unless the housing falls into an exemption called "housing for older persons."
Memorandum of HUD Region 1, Effect of the Fair Housing Act on Eligibilityfor
HUD-AssistedElderly/HandicappedDevelopments (Apr. 11, 1991). No federal developments or programs had, as of May, 1991, been designated by the HUD Secretary as meeting the definition of "housing for older persons."
105. Approximately 300 liveable units owned by BHA in "elderly/handicapped" developments are vacant. Boston Housing Authority has
now agreed with counsel from GBLS that it will revise its admissions procedures
for these developments. For a discussion of the laws governing their decision,
see supra, note 93-94 and accompanying text.
106. Benoit Interview, supra note 31. For the period July, 1989, through
October, 1990, 85% of the applicants offered BHA "Elderly" Housing were
standard applicants. They did not hold or claim a federal preference. BOSTON
HOUSING AUTHORITY, BHA RESPONSE TO HUD MANAGEMENT REVIEW 52. (Dec.
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homeless or precariously housed disabled or hahdicapped. Even
if there were not units standing vacant, eliminating such discrimination should result in relatively rapid offers of "turnover" housing resources to applicants with federal preference status.107
It is not enough to remove such blanket exclusions of the
non-mobility impaired disabled and handicapped from housing
for which federal law makes them eligible. It will also be necessary, in order to open up such housing resources as well as all
other "family" housing resources to many of the now homeless,
to eliminate "tenant suitability" standards. These standards have
a discriminatory impact on the handicapped, particularly the
mentally handicapped. Recently, advocates for mentally handicapped applicants won a landmark case on this issue. 108
Although the judgment technically only applies to the local PHA,
HUD has written instructions to all PHAs to follow the court's
ruling that the Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act apply to
1990) (Boston Housing Authority response to HUD REPORT, supra note 58). In
contrast, only 15% of the offers of family housing went to standard applicants.
Id. Even this number is legally questionable in light of the allegedly years-long
waiting list maintained by BHA for preference holders. This extraordinarily
high percentage of offers to standard applicants for "elderly" housing may understate the number of federal preference holders seeking elderly housing. A
BHA rule states that an applicant claiming federal preference status must apply
on a city-wide list. If an applicant rejects the first apartment offered, their name
is moved to the bottom of the list. Standard applicants, however, are entitled to
list three developments at which they would like to live. HUD may invalidate
this differential treatment (or GBLS may challenge it) as violative of the Fair
Housing Act.
107. Many housing advocates, as well as PHA managers, are concerned on
a practical level that it is not good housing policy to "mix" substantial numbers
of handicapped, particularly the mentally handicapped tenants with elderly residents of public or subsidized housing. They fear that such mixing will result in
diminished quality of life for both the aged residents and the disabled and lead
to disproportionate "housing failure" for the handicapped. These concerns
should only affect the remedy sought, such as "reasonable accommodations" to
assist the mentally handicapped to maintain their tenancies, not whether advocates seek to enforce the rights of the handicapped to public and subsidized
housing.
108. Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
The three plaintiffs were denied housing by the Rochester Housing Authority.
Id. at 1003. The first plaintiff was 31 years old and had been diagnosed as a
schizophrenic. Id. at 1004. The second plaintiff was elderly and physically disabled. Id. The third plaintiff was elderly, physically disabled and diagnosed as a
schizophrenic. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the housing authority's "ability to
live independently" standard was applied, with respect to disabled persons, arbitrarily and subjectively. Id. They claimed, therefore, that the practice violated
federal statutes and regulations. Id. The court found that the housing authority's actions had a "discriminatory effect" and an "adverse impact." Id. at 1007.
The court further held that the housing authority's jusitifications were "without
merit," and therefore, the practice violated the Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1007, 1011.
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PHAs.' 0 9 HUD has also agreed that the court's decision is required by the Fair Housing Act Amendments, which HUD is
bound to uphold.1 10 Realistically, however, there will not be automatic compliance with these instructions. HUD is notorious for
failing to supervise PHAs, and particularly private owners. Actual
enforcement will require state and local-level vigilance. In addition, it is common for PHAs and private subsidized owners to systematically exclude applicants on suitability grounds, such as
denials for alleged prior damage to apartments or prior records
of "bad" tenancies, despite proof of subsequent rehabilitation
from whatever caused the "bad" acts (i.e. failure to pay rent).
These denials may be challengeable on handicap discrimination
grounds. Needless to say, this is a fertile area for creative legal
work.
IV.

SOME LONG-TERM QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MERIT OF
FOCUSING ON SUBSIDY ELIGIBILITY

In any single year, and perhaps over an even longer time
frame, advocacy targeted at who gets available subsidized housing
resources is, admittedly, a strategy which does not get beyond a
zero-sum game, except in the instances when available subsidies
are not being used. Therefore, focusing on access and eligibility
issues on behalf of the homeless, particularly preference rules, is
potentially divisive to the broader constituency for increasing the
supply of housing benefits and affordable housing programs."It
It may be sufficient justification that obtaining housing subsidies
for otherwise homeless clients is a critical service to our arguably
most needy clients." 2 However, when colleagues challenge this
work as "merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic," it
would be preferable to have a better response than "all the appli13
cants are not equally likely to drown." 1
109. See id. at 1011.
110. Memorandum from HUD to PHAs, PHA Determinationof "Ability to Live
Independently" as a Criterionfor Admission to Public Housing (Dec. 31, 1990).

111. Advocacy aimed at procedural fairness, such as adequate notices, reasonable verification requirements, and fair hearings, presumably is to the benefit
of all applicants, although such efforts may not be positively received by all nonprofit housing developers in their role as landlords.
112. Legal services programs are generally restricted from representing clients whose income exceeds 125% of the federal poverty line. Therefore, many
applicants for public and subsidized housing programs (the less needy ones) are
financially ineligible for our services.
113. One could also counter as to why this challenge should apply to the
validity of representing applicants for a limited resource, but not to the defense

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss5/5

34

Sard: Housing the Homeless through Expanding Access to Existing Subsidi

1991]

HOUSING THE HOMELESS

1147

Although there is not yet evidence to prove it in the housing
context, recent experience in other social welfare programs suggests that there is a potentially expansive dynamic which can result from making visible the "holes in the safety net." For
example, concerted publicity about the Reagan Administration's
cut-off of Supplemental Security Income and Social Security Disability benefits to tens of thousands of mentally handicapped recip4
ients finally prompted judicial and congressional sanction. 11
This ensured that the disabled continued to receive benefits." 5
In the mid-1980s, Congress redressed a few of the eligibility restrictions it had imposed in the Aid for Families with Dependent
Children and Food Stamp programs after hearing evidence that
6
the harm inflicted was more severe than intended."
Similarly, one desired result of the struggle to expand subsidized housing priority for the homeless is that increasing the
number of applicants entitled to preference will make the need
for subsidized housing even more visible, with a consequent increase in resources to respond to the need. It is true that homelessness is already the most visible part of the housing crisis.
However, many policy-makers and members of the public nonetheless believe that the homeless are without housing because
they are somehow not "housing-ready," or they do not want
housing. 1 7 Such detractions from the fundamental claim to
housing should be undercut by cold proof of the numbers of applicants found eligible and entitled to priority status for subsidized housing whose needs cannot be met.
In addition, to the extent that housing authorities, legislators, and/or better off applicants on the waiting lists object to the
homeless being served "instead of" others, the challenge is to
enlist the energy of these potentially more politically influential
groups in the struggle to expand the supply of resources. Such
of tenants facing eviction from the same limited resource. Many legal services
programs devote substantial resources to such eviction defense.
114. See The Macneil/Lehrer Report: Cutting Disability-Is it Fair? (television
broadcast, Feb. 14, 1983) (300,000 persons dropped from disability roles by
1983).
115. Id. (claimants dropped from rolls could continue to collect benefits
while they appealed).
116. Congress raised the gross income limitations on eligibility of the working poor for AFDC and extended families were allowed to receive increased
Food Stamps. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(18) (1988) (amended in 1984).
117. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, HouSING CONFERENCE: NATIONAL HousING
POLICY ISSUEs 65-66 (1989) (remarks of Dr. James Stimpson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of HUD) (discussing the difficulties in housing homeless single men).
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hoped for alliances may require that new resources be targeted to
broader eligibility groups than the already homeless. If the resources can truly be expanded more than homeless advocates
could accomplish on their own, such an alliance is generally
8
beneficial. "1
The second major question raised by pursuing strategies to
increase access to public and subsidized housing is whether increased centralization and standardization of programs and rules
is really going to help low income and homeless applicants over
the long-run. Advocacy pressure towards centralization of formerly locally-administered programs and increased specification
of eligibility rules and procedures has been a key element of the
welfare rights strategy for the last twenty-five years." 9 Some proponents of progressive welfare programs have criticized these
strategies for rigidifying welfare decisionmaking.12 0 Rules can be
as exclusionary as unfettered discretion. However, experience
shows that the politically disfavored are generally best off when
programs for their benefit are administered at a level more distant from local prejudice, and when decisions must be made in
accordance with rules subject to review.12 1
Even if one accepts these general lessons drawn from the social welfare context, there is still a question whether the nature of
housing programs requires or suggests a different answer than
that in the welfare context. Arguably, the local nature of housing
construction programs, with the inevitable issues of zoning,
neighborhood mix, and the like, require as much locally-based
118. It was in this spirit that the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless
supported a proposal put forth by a number of housing advocacy groups and
later adopted by EOCD. They proposed that some applicants imminently at-risk
of homelessness share top priority with the homeless under new tenant selection
regulations for the state-funded rental assistance program and that 10% of the
resources go to applicants on the standard list. See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 760,
§ 44 (1989). Such provisions do create more common ground between advocates for the homeless and tenants' groups. But this effort to make common
ground with the housing authorities proved to be useless. Fifteen housing authorities successfully sued to invalidate the preference rules under the governing
state statute. Arlington Hous. Auth. v. Secretary of Communities & Dev., 409
Mass. 354, 566 N.E.2d 600 (1991).
119. See Sard, The Role of The Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 367 (1988); Hovemann & Demkovich, Making Some Sense Out of the Welfare
"Mess", NAT'L J., Jan. 8, 1977, at 44 (discussing efforts to reform the ad hoc
federal welfare system).
120. See, e.g., Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1983) (current welfare practice boils down to three basic
themes: "formalization of entitlement," "bureaucratization of administration"
and "proletarianization of the work force").
121. See generally Sard, supra note 119.
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support as can be mustered. Accepting this as fact for construction programs, "walk-around" subsidies such as the federal Section 8 program are still essentially income maintenance programs
in a housing guise: They are income supplements earmarked for
housing needs. Program beneficiaries are dispersed in the community, in whatever private units they can locate. No local support for building additional housing is necessary. Consequently,
whatever arguments for local administration of housing construction programs there may be, they do not appear to apply to pro12 2
grams which operate strictly as rent subsidies.
This discussion of the long-term implications of strategies to
increase access to existing subsidies and public/subsidized housing is necessarily preliminary. A more thorough analysis of similar strategies used in other social welfare programs would help
evolve strategies to reform the administration of housing programs to meet the needs of our most low income citizens. While
such inquiry continues and while efforts to increase housing resources go on, advocates should not overlook the substantial
promise which the above strategies hold for creating real housing
opportunities for homeless clients.
122. Whether increasing the supply of rent subsidies to be used to pay uncontrolled rents to private landlords (as opposed to the construction, substantial
rehabilitation or purchase of publicly or non-profit owned housing) is a good
use of public housing dollars represents a serious issue of housing policy though
beyond the scope of this article. However, the potentially greater accessibility of
these income-maintenance-like housing subsidies to the politically and socially
disfavored, such as the homeless and traditional victims of prejudice such as
racial and ethnic minorities, is a vital element of such an analysis. For further
discussion of this topic, see Sard, Roisman & Hartman, supra note 3; Polikoff,
supra note 87.
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